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be well reasoned and in agreement with the apparent trend in New
York toward flexible application of the rules of evidence to meet the
very practical problems encountered by both parties in a products
liability suit. 4 ' As long as the habitual conduct evidence admitted
involves a repeated particularized reaction by a person in control of
a situation, it would seem that the considerations underlying the
exclusion of general habit evidence will not be violated by continued
application of the Halloran rule.
Evidence of subsequent repairs held admissible in products liability
action.
New York courts consistently have ruled that proof of postoc-
currence repairs is inadmissible to establish a defendant's negli-
gence."' The admission of such evidence is deemed contrary to pub-
lic policy on the ground that it tends to discourage reparative mea-
sures.' Recently, however, in Barry v. Manglass, 2 5 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that these policy considerations
do not require that evidence of postaccident repairs be excluded in
products liability actions.24
person's habit of smoking in bed probably is not sufficiently deliberate to be admissible.
McLaughlin, Evidence, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1977, at 2, col. 2.
2"2 The evidentiary problems encountered in products liability suits seem to encourage
liberalization of the rules of evidence in such litigation. See, e.g., Barry v. Manglass, 55 App.
Div. 2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877 (2d Dep't 1976) (auto recall letters held admissible in a
products liability action); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Div. 2d 211, 223-25, 377 N.Y.S.2d
118, 130-31 (2d Dep't 1975) (dicta) (the continued viability of the hearsay rule in products
liability cases questioned).
213 See, e.g., Getty v. Town of Hamlin, 127 N.Y. 636, 638, 27 N.E. 399, 399-400 (1891)
(evidence of postaccident repair inadmissible to prove a defendant's negligence); Causa v.
Kenny, 156 App. Div. 134, 137-38, 141 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (lst Dep't 1913) (repairs in structure
not admissible to establish negligence). See also W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 168 (10th ed. J.
Prince 1973).
Although subsequent repair evidence is not admissible to establish negligence, it may
be used for other relevant purposes such as establishing who controlled a particular instru-
mentality. See id.
2' See Causa v. Kenny, 156 App. Div. 134, 141 N.Y.S. 98 (1st Dep't 1913); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 275 at 666 (2d ed. 1972). Postoccurrence repair evidence has also been condemned
as prejudicial. For example, in Fraumberg v. Schmohl, 190 N.Y.S. 710 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1921), plaintiff suffered injuries when she fell on a stairway in a house owned by a
defendant. The trial court permitted testimony which established that subsequent to the
accident, the owner of the building caused repairs to be made. In overturning this ruling, the
appellate court stated: "[Sluch evidence has universally and most frequently been con-
demned as inadmissible and highly prejudicial." Id. at 711. (emphasis added).
"1 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1976).
216 Strict products liability was recognized as a viable cause of action in New York in
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). There, the Court
of Appeals held that "under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a
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The plaintiffs in Barry were injured when an automobile in
which they were riding was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant
Manglass. Asserting a cause of action in negligence against Mang-
lass and one in strict products liability against General Motors,
manufacturer of the 1969 Chevrolet that Manglass was driving,
plaintiffs filed suit in Supreme Court, Rockland County. 47 The ac-
tion against the manufacturer focused upon whether the collision
was caused by a defect in the motor mount of Manglass' car. Gen-
eral Motors conceded that the left motor mount was separated from
the automobile's framework after impact, but maintained that this
was caused by the accident. Plaintiff's experts, on the other hand,
contended that due to a defect the motor mount had separated prior
to the impact. 48
In attempting to bolster their experts' testimony at trial, plain-
tiffs sought to introduce portions of two recall letters which had
been distributed by General Motors to owners of 1969 Chevrolets.249
These letters, sent at least 2 months after the Barry accident, ad-
vised owners of a potentially defective motor mount in models such
as the Manglass vehicle. Despite General Motors' objections, the
letters were admitted into evidence. A verdict was returned adjudg-
ing both defendants liable, and judgment was entered upon the
verdict.
On appeal, Justice Shapiro, writing for the unanimous appel-
late division panel, held that "evidence of [General Motors'] post-
injury remedial safety measures" had been properly admitted.250 In
so ruling, the court found the policy arguments21s which militate
defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial
factor in bringing about [the] injury." Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-
70. For a discussion of the Codling decision, see The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 611, 616
(1974).
2" Defendant Manglass had filed a cross-claim against General Motors. 55 App. Div. 2d
at 3, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 872. Upon a finding by the jury that Manglass was negligent and that
this negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, the trial court dismissed the cross-
claim. The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed and ordered a new trial, finding
that the lower court had improperly admitted evidence concerning defendant's intoxication
on another occasion. Id. at 12-13, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
211 Id. at 4, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
2,9 The first recall letter contained the following warning: .'[W]e are sending this letter
to call to your attention a possible safety hazard which exists should separation of an engine
mount occur on your vehicle."' It further cautioned that .'[a] sharp left turn during forward
acceleration can increase the possibility of engine rotation if the left engine mount has sepa-
rated."' Id. at 4-5, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 873, (quoting Letter from General Motors to Chevrolet
Owners (March 1972)).
2 55 App. Div. 2d at 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
-9 Id., 389 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
19771
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against this type of evidence in negligence cases inapplicable to
strict products liability actions.252 Faced with potentially enormous
liability if a defective product remains on the market, " 'it is mani-
festly unrealistic to suggest that (a manufacturer) will forego mak-
ing improvements . . .and risk innumerable additional lawsuits
. . .simply because evidence of adoption of such an improvement
may be admitted in an action founded on strict liability . .. 253
Any prejudice which might result from the admission of the recall
letters, Justice Shapiro reasoned, may be minimized by a charge to
the jury stressing that the letters do not establish that the defect
existed in the particular vehicle involved in the action.254 In any
event, since the plaintiff in a products liability suit must establish
"that the defect existed . . . at the time when the product left the
hands of the manufacturer, ' 255 the court concluded, "the relevancy
212 Id. at 6-9, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 874-76. Prior to discussing the policy considerations under-
lying the subsequent repairs doctrine, the court observed that "[1]iterally. of course, [the
rule] does not apply [to this case] because the letters were not an aftermath of the acci-
dent." Id. at 6, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
20 Id. at 8, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (quoting Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d
113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148, 1153, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974)). For an in-depth analysis of this
area, see Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837,
848-49.
In response to General Motors' public policy argument that the admission of the letters
"would discourage manufacturers from announcing a possible defect," 55 App. Div. 2d at 10,
389 N.Y.S.2d at 877, the court pointed out that such an action is mandated by federal law.
Id. Under the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (Supp.
V 1975), a manufacturer finding a defect in one of its automobiles which may be present in
other vehicles it manufactured has a duty to warn all who have purchased the product of the
defect. Id. Failure to comply with the act may lead to the imposition of civil penalties. Id. §
1415(c)(1). In addition, as the Barry court noted, a manufacturer having knowledge that his
product is inherently dangerous is under a common law duty to warn purchasers. 55 App.
Div. 2d at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 876. See Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 49 App. Div. 2d
250, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928 (4th Dep't 1975) (failure to warn may be sufficient basis for strict
liability in tort action); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 176, 99 N.W.2d
627, 634 (1959) ("[the duty to warn of known danger inherent in a product . . . has long
been a part of the manufacturer's liability doctrine"). Due to the enormity of a manufac-
turer's potential liability for failure to warn, it is unlikely that he would refuse to give notice
out of fear that it might later be used as evidence against him. Note, Products Liability and
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 848-49.
25 55 App. Div. 2d at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 877. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) wherein the court upheld the admission of a manufacturer's recall
letter, but emphasized that the letter alone does not establish a prima facie case. The letter
is some evidence, however, that a defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer.
Id. at 58.
2" 55 App. Div. 2d at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The doctrine of strict products liability
differs from that of absolute liability. A plaintiff seeking to recover in strict liability must
show that the product had a defect at the time of delivery which rendered it unreasonably
dangerous to consumers and that this defect was the proximate cause of the injury. Jerry v.
Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2d Dep't 1974).
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of the recall letters outweighs any possible prejudice" which might
be occasioned by their receipt in evidence. 56 Because the trial court
had not attempted to dispell this prejudice via careful jury instruc-
tions, however, the cause was remanded for a retrial. '
It is submitted that the result reached in Barry is both desirable
and just. The postoccurrence repair doctrine recently has been
sharply attacked by a commentator who maintained that it deprives
many deserving litigants of relevant and often crucial evidence.258
Courts of some jurisdictions, perhaps in recognition of this severe
effect of the rule, have refused to apply it in products liability ac-
tions. 9 Beyond its adverse impact on the truth-seeking process, the
doctrine's principal justification may be unfounded; no empirical
data exists to substantiate the claim that admission of subsequent
repair evidence would discourage reparative measures. 20 By refus-
ing to extend the rule, the Barry court has ensured that a jury in a
products liability action will not be unreasonably "deprived of a
complete picture" of the case's factual setting.2 1 Hopefully, Barry
is the first step towards the elimination of the harsh subsequent
repairs doctrine from New York's law of evidence. 26 2
Sale of cooperative stock held subject to real property statute of
frauds.
An individual purchasing shares of stock in a cooperative hous-
ing corporation receives a proprietary lease entitling him to occupy
an apartment in a housing complex.2 3 The combination of stock and
238 55 App. Div. 2d at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 876. Additionally, the court, taking judicial
notice of the millions of recall letters already issued by car manufacturers, reasoned that if
the letters were not admitted, the jurors "might well . . . believe that no such letters were
issued and that the claimed defect was a solitary one and did not in fact exist." Id. at 11,
389 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
" The trial court's failure to properly charge the jury prompted the appellate division
to order a new trial. The charge was prejudicial, the court held, because it was not made clear
to the jurors that the letters were not admissions that the vehicle involved in the case was
defective. Id.
-1 See Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of
Repair, 7 THE FORUM 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
211 See, e.g., Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959);
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
2 3 Schwartz, supra note 258, at 6.
"I Id. at 7.
282 Apparently, other New York courts have reached the same conclusion as the Barry
court. See Murphy v. General Motors Corp., 55 App. Div. 2d 486, 391 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't
1977), wherein the appellate division observed, without comment, that the trial court had
admitted a recall letter into evidence.
22 See 2 P. ROHAN & R. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02(5)(e)
1977]
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leasehold interests which the purchaser acquires creates difficulties
for those attempting to define the nature of the interest possessed
by the tenant-stockholder.264 Recently, in Sebel v. Williams,6 ' the
Civil Court, Queens County, held that the sale of cooperative stock
involves the transfer of an interest in real property and that the real
property statute of frauds216 thus requires such a transaction to be
in writing."7
In Sebel, defendants entered into an oral contract to purchase
shares of stock in a housing cooperative and the accompanying pro-
prietary lease which was allocated to that stock.2 8 Defendants failed
to purchase the stock, however, and plaintiffs instituted an action
for breach of contract.269 Contending that the cooperative stock and
lease consistently have been held to be personal property,270 plain-
tiffs asserted that the sale did not represent the exchange of an
interest in real estate. Arguing, therefore, that the statute of frauds
was not applicable to the sale, plaintiffs maintained that the oral
agreement was enforceable notwithstanding the absence of a written
contract.2'
While agreeing with plaintiffs' argument that the stock and
lease were personal property, the transfer of which did not consti-
tute a sale of an interest in real estate, the Sebet court nevertheless
(1977). Normally, in lieu of a fixed rental, a monthly service charge covering the tenant's
proportionate share of the expenses of the cooperative is assessed. The amount of the assess-
ment is usually based upon the percentage of shares owned by the cooperator. See Isaacs,
History and Development of the Co-operative Apartment, PRAc. LAW, Nov. 1959, 62, 66.
264 See Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apart-
ment: Realty or Personalty? 73 COLUM. L. REv. 250 (1973).
"1 88 Misc. 2d 411, 388 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1976).
2,1 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-703(2) (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1976-1977) provides: "A
contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any real property,
or an interest therein, is void unless the contract . . . is in writing ... "
"1 88 Misc. 2d at 414, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
264 Id. at 411-12, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
264 Id. at 412, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
I" Id. at 413, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 495. In support of their contention that the sale of coopera-
tive stock and the accompanying lease constituted the sale of personal property, plaintiffs
cited Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1971),
and State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 84 Misc. 2d 161, 378 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1975), af'd per curiam, 53 App. Div. 2d 814, 385 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dep't 1976). In Silverman,
the appellate division determined that cooperative stock qualifies as a "good," the sale of
which is governed by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 37 App. Div. 2d at 172, 323
N.Y.S.2d at 45. Subsequently, in Shor, the Supreme Court, New York County, in the course
of determining lien priorities, concluded that cooperative stock is personal property. 84 Misc.
2d at 164, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
21 88 Misc. 2d at 413, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
[Vol. 51:786
